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At a rhetorical level, significant progress has been made towards 
establishing a coordinated global framework for the governance of 
capital markets.  Implementation remains some way off, however, not 
least because of a failure to address pivotal structural issues.  What 
constitutes systemic risk?  What are the specific responsibilities of 
specific epistemic communities, such as the legal and audit 
professions?  The failure to engage in substantive discussions about 
the causes and consequences of the erosion of social norms within 
these professions means that regulatory and policy authorities risk 
privileging symbolic over substantive change.  This Article examines 
the trajectory of reform since the onset of the global financial crisis 
and argues that a failure to address the ethical dimensions of the 
identified problems preordains failure. 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis (GFC) demonstrated how individual, 
corporate and regulatory misjudgments were exponentially 
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exacerbated by a myopic faith in ideational constructs.  This was 
accompanied by an ongoing failure to resolve an existential conflict 
between the demands of public and private law.1  Subsequent political 
rhetoric holds out the tantalizing promise of the most far-reaching 
review of corporate governance, corporate law and financial 
regulation in a generation.2  There is undoubtedly political capital to 
be gained from introducing such reframing mechanisms.3  At the 
same time, reform of such magnitude is also exceptionally difficult to 
render operational in a domestic, let alone international context.  As a 
consequence, the practical focus has been on technical issues.  The 
danger moving forward is that a reliance on technical solutions will 
provide the illusion of substantive reform but fail to address the 
substantive problems.  Moreover, the alacrity with which loans to the 
banking sector have been paid back, particularly in the United States, 
has reduced direct influence over the internal governance 
arrangements of the very institutions that caused the crisis.  Senior 
banking figures there have made it clear that the febrile nature of 
 
1 David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201–02 (1990); see 
also Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private 
Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (1982); for explication of the case for 
breaking down the artificial boundaries, see HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 53 
(1999) (noting the normative advantages associated with the “[p]roductive [d]isintegration 
of [p]rivate [l]aw”). 
2 See Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Remarks on the Global Economy, at the Reuters 
Building, London, (Oct. 13, 2008) available at http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files 
/Politics/documents/2008/10/13/reutersspeech13102008.pdf.  Brown subsequently went 
further, calling for international coordination and arguing that the G20 needed to “discuss 
whether we need a better economic and social contract to reflect the global responsibilities 
of financial institutions to society.”  Gordon Brown, Press Conference, G2O Finance 
Minister Meeting, St. Andrews, Scotland, (Nov. 7, 2009) available at http://www.real 
clearworld.com/articles/2009/11/10/the_uk_prime_ministers_speech_to_g20_finance_min
isters_97341.html; see also Barack Obama, Remarks on Financial Regulatory Reform, 
Press Conference, White House, Washington D.C., (June 17, 2009) in DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. DCPD200900474, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86287; 
Nicholas Sarkozy, Opening Address to the World Economic Forum, Davos, (Jan. 27, 
2010) available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Sarkozy_en.pdf. 
3 See Sarkozy, supra note 2.  Of critical importance here is France’s impending 
chairmanship of the G20.  See also Gillian Tett, Do Not Dismiss Sarkozy’s Back to the 
Future Currency Plan, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 29, 2010, at 34 available at 
http://gcalhoun.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/10-01-29-ft-do-not-dismiss-sarkozys-back-to 
-the-future-currency-plan-carry-trade.pdf (the respected Capital Markets Editor noting the 
speech “reveals more about France’s determination to shape the global intellectual 
debate—at a time when America is looking increasingly confused—than any clear policy 
initiative”). 
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capital markets could necessitate further intervention at a time when 
state capacity is stretched to and beyond capacity.4 
Irrespective of the utility of reducing leverage ratios, restricting 
proprietary trading, or the capacity of banking licenses from holding 
stakes in alternative asset classes, such as hedge funds and private 
equity, it is essential to remember that the crisis is derived essentially 
from ethical failure.  It reflects an erosion of restraint.  It represents 
the delayed manifestation of past failure to take into adequate 
consideration the social, economic, and political consequences of the 
expansion of the financial sector or the dynamics of capital market 
regulation.  Of particular relevance here is the privileging of 
emasculated conceptions of regulatory and corporate responsibility.  
If we are to reengineer the corporate contract, it is essential that we 
understand much better the forces that “denatured” financial 
capitalism.5  Moreover, that understanding needs to be rooted within a 
broader practical and philosophical conversation—namely, what is 
the purpose of the financial sector?  What restraints should be placed 
on growth to protect society from externalities, conveniently excised 
in the past from macroeconomic models and legal and regulatory 
policy frameworks?  What specific duties and responsibilities should 
be demanded of particular communities of practice in enhancing 
market integrity?  Without such an examination, there is a profound 
danger that we will not only fail to engender meaningful change.  We 
will privilege existing flawed power relations. 
The interlocking governance, regulatory and political failures that 
generated the GFC provided a fin de siècle moment.  Globalization, 
deregulation and innovation, each informed and legitimated by the 
 
4 See, e.g., First Public Hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 111th 
Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Blankfein testimony] available at http://fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs 
/2010-0113-Transcript.pdf (testimony of Lloyd Blankfein, Chairman and CEO, Goldman 
Sachs). 
5 The French President, Nicholas Sarkozy described the GFC as a “crisis of 
globalization” and noted: 
The crisis we are experiencing is not a crisis of capitalism.  It is a crisis of the 
denaturing of capitalism—a crisis linked to loss of the values and references that 
have always been the foundation of capitalism.  Capitalism has always been 
inseparable from a system of values, a conception of civilisation, an idea of 
mankind.  Purely financial capitalism is a distortion, and we have seen the risks it 
involves for the world economy.  But anti-capitalism is a dead end that is even 
worse.  We can only save capitalism by rebuilding it, by restoring its moral 
dimension.  I know that this expression will call forth many questions.  What do we 
need, in the end, if it is not rules, principles, a governance that reflects shared 
values, a common morality? 
Sarkozy, supra note 2 at 1, 3. 
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transmission of a neo-liberal agenda that progressively dominated in 
the aftermath of the Cold War, all came under sustained question.  
Nowhere was this rupture more keenly encapsulated than in the 
extraordinary congressional testimony given by Alan Greenspan, the 
former chairman of the Federal Reserve, in October 2008.6  
Greenspan admitted that what had been represented as the 
economically rational was politically constructed; that his faith in the 
capacity of the markets to self-correct was, in fact, based on what 
turned out to be flawed ideological assumptions.7 
Watching Greenspan give evidence, one was acutely reminded of 
Don Fabrizio Corbera, the antihero of Giuseppe Tomasi Di 
Lampedusa’s masterpiece, The Leopard.8  Set in Sicily on the cusp of 
Italian unification, the novel is a meditation on the impact of 
potentially epochal change on existing power relations.  While 
Greenspan shuffles off the world stage, his reputation for sagacity in 
ruins, the fight for legitimacy transfers to a new generation of 
financiers, symbolized in The Leopard by the aged count’s nephew, 
Tancredi, who admonishes his mentor not to give up hope, telling 
him, “[i]f we want things to stay as they are, things will have to 
change.”9 
The epigram provides a telling indication of how even the most 
radical ruptures can be subverted.  It also serves as a metaphor for a 
more pressing and contemporary danger.  This centers on the 
dispiriting reality that the conceptual and practical implications of the 
GFC may have neither been internalized by communities of practice 
nor necessarily understood at policy level.  Notwithstanding the 
enormous dislocation caused by the crisis, beyond the rhetoric, 
fundamental change is, therefore, by no means assured.  As such, the 
window of opportunity for more fundamental reform is closing.  With 
it, the possibility of reengineering a social and economic compact 
capable of global application and global legitimacy also recedes from 
view.  It is only through mapping the trajectory of actual and 
proposed reform against both the causes and the rhetorical response to 
the crisis and the choice of forum that this myopia becomes apparent.  
The critical but unexplored question is why this occurred. 
 
6 Evidence to House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. Congress, 
Washington D.C., 23 October 2008, 1 (Alan Greenspan). 
7 Id. 
8 GIUSEPPE DI LAMPEDUSA, THE LEOPARD (1958) (Archibald Colquhoun trans., 
Pantheon, 1960). 
9 Id. at 40. 
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A necessary first step is to generate a more granular understanding 
of how accountability is conceived within specific communities of 
practice.  Part II sets out four distinct and potentially 
incommensurable interpretations of accountability’s function in 
capital market discourse.  It links this to Oliver Williamson’s 
identification of four equally distinct domains of analysis.10  The 
maintenance of the integrity of each level forms a critical component 
in designing workable systems of governance.  To be effective, 
accountability strategies must be capable of engineering change 
within and between each domain.  Part III maps how these competing 
interpretations have been used in official discourse to explain the 
crisis and for what purpose.  Part IV provides a detailed account of 
the limitations associated with advancing solutions that do not address 
the normative dimension through an extended case study of the 
approach adopted by the Republic of Ireland, one of the European 
countries most impacted by the GFC.  Part V argues that substantive 
reform requires the identification of public duties within a dynamic 
and responsive system of oversight in which the non-calculative 
social contract is itself revisited. 
II 
THE NEBULOUS MEANING OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
In the aftermath of crisis, regulatory theory and practice has often 
moved progressively through solutions based on the practical and 
normative advantages of governance, responsibility, integrity, and 
accountability.  The problem is that we rarely stop to examine what 
these nebulous cluster concepts actually mean.  The GFC provides a 
particularly stark example of past failure to examine the incremental 
effect of transactional imperatives on the integrity of the overarching 
system.  This derives, in large part, from misguided confidence in the 
restraining strength of what Oliver Williamson has termed the 
underpinning “non-calculative social contract.”11  As Figure 1 below 
demonstrates, this refers to the combination of values that generate 
societal obligation.  Critical in this regard are the traditional virtues, 
including integrity and honesty.  Although a weak facsimile of these 
 
10 Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 597 (2000). 
11 Id. at 596–600.  Williamson notes that analysis of this “level one” component of 
social theory is conspicuous by its absence within regulatory studies.  The other three 
levels comprise institutional arrangements viewed primarily through property rights and 
positive political theory, governance mechanisms through transaction cost economics and 
resource allocation frameworks generally examined through agency theory. 
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values can be represented in legal form through requirements of 
fiduciary obligation, for example, the concept of the non-calculative 
social contract suggests commitment to a much broader sense of 
societal empathy, one that cannot be transacted around through the 
privileging of individual rights.  Moreover, it suggests the inherently 
moral basis of social relations within the marketplace.12  The 
practitioner and policy community, including academics primarily 
associated with the law and economics tradition, focused on reducing 
transaction costs as the primary (if not sole) indicator of efficiency.13  
The impact of this privileging within and between each level of 
analysis on market participants’ adherence to values (such as 
reputation, integrity and trust—all key determinants of confidence) 
was left unexplored.  The entire construct was based on the belief that 
the terms of the underpinning social contract would remain 
unaffected. 
 
Level Frequency of intervention Purpose 
 
12 For a critique from within mainstream economics, see Amartya Sen, “Introduction” 
in Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; London: Penguin, 2009 ed.) vii–
xxiv (noting that neglect of Smith’s opus has led to stunted appreciation of the complexity 
and “plurality of human motivations, the connections between ethics and economics and 
the co-dependent—rather than free-standing—role of institutions in general and free 
markets in particular in the functioning of the economy”: at viii). 
13 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); for critique, see Kent Greenfield, September 11th and the End of 
History for Corporate Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1409 (2001).  For original formulation, see 
Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 
(1989).  Some have gone further, see Amartya Sen’s stinging rebuke on rational choice 
and its proponents in the legal community in Smith, supra note 12 (in which he decries the 
“experts in so-called law and economics [who] have been cheerfully practicing the same 
narrow art.  And they have been citing Smith in alleged support of their cramped and 
simplistic theory of human rationality” at x).  As Claudio Bario of the Bank of 
International Settlements has acknowledged, self-deception is not a basis for credible 
policy calibration. “To varying degrees, policymakers, just like everyone else, 
underestimated the threat.  They were caught up in what, in retrospect, has partly turned 
out to be a Great Illusion.  And even had the threat been fully recognized—and some no 
doubt did—the political economy pressures not to change policies would have been 
enormous.  On the face of it, the regimes in place had proved to be extremely successful.  
A lot of reputational capital was at stake.  And not even the often more critical academic 
community provided any support for change.  Indeed, as regards macroeconomic policy, 
that community turned out to be part of the problem, not of the solution.” See Claudio 
Borio, ‘The Financial Crisis of 2007-? Macroeconomic and Policy Lessons’ (G20 
Workshop on the Global Economy, Mumbai, 24–26 May 2009) 13 http://www.g20.org 
/Documents/g20_workshop_causes_of_the_crisis.pdf. 
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Social norms 100–1000 years Noncalculative social contract 
Institutional 
environment  10–100 years 
Overarching legal, political 
and bureaucratic 
framework 
Governance 
arrangements  1–10 years 
Aligning transactions 
within accepted rules of 
the game 
Resource alocation  Continuous Incentive alignments 
FIGURE 1.  Williamson’s Governance in Action14 
This was both a conceptual and practical mistake of enormous 
import.  As the crisis of confidence intensified beginning in August 
2007, significant and sophisticated major markets did not merely 
behave sub-optimally.  In the memorable phrasing of analysts at the 
French investment bank BNP Paribas they simply “vaporized.”15  As 
a consequence, central banks were forced to inject unprecedented 
levels of liquidity.  The logic of competitive markets came under 
sustained assault and so too did previous policy choices that allowed 
for a magnification of systemic risk.  It became apparent that the 
progressive hollowing out of regulatory and legal frameworks 
throughout the 1990s—particularly in London and New York—and 
the demise of relational banking, and the creation of a shadow 
banking system combined to displace rather than eliminate risk and 
responsibility.  Fears that the increasing sophistication of financial 
markets inevitably would be accompanied by enhanced volatility and 
chronic instability were ignored.16 
The unintended implications of privileging innovation over 
security across the financial sector are now apparent for the 
corporation, the market in which it is nested and the underpinning 
 
14 Williamson, supra note 10, at 597. 
15 Floyd Norris, A New Kind of Bank run Tests Old Safeguards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 
2007, at B1. 
16 HYMAN MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 315 (2002). 
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legal and regulatory frameworks.17  As a consequence we have 
reached a tipping point in the theory and practice of financial 
regulation.18  Despite this acknowledged failure, we appear to remain 
wedded to falsified conceptions of what markets can achieve without 
guidance and, where necessary, intervention.  In part, the faith is 
linked to purposive ambiguity over the concept of accountability itself 
and how it is understood by communities of practice as a framing 
device to delineate duties and responsibilities and emphasize rights.19 
 
17 Regulatory Restructuring and the Reform of the Financial System, H. Comm. on Fin. 
Serv., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Joseph Stiglitz); see also ROGER BOOTLE, THE 
TROUBLE WITH MARKETS 239 (2009); Edward Connors, Future Fund Chief Sees Day Of 
Reckoning for Banks, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Jan. 14, 2009, at 1, 38 (quoting David Murray, 
head of the Australian Future Fund: “Everybody got carried away by the concept of a 
‘millionaires factory’ which was not culturally good. Where you don’t want your brightest, 
or at least too many of them, is in jobs which spend time interpreting or arbitraging rules.  
This is not really effective work[,] and a lot of investment banking is that type of deal 
structuring, which is not very constructive.  It produces over-engineered stuff that is the 
first to break when anything goes wrong.”); see also, generally, The Financial Crisis and 
the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) [hereinafter Greenspan Testimony] available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20081024163819.pdf (testimony of 
Dr. Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve) (discussing his admission 
of regulatory fealty to an “ideological construct”). 
18 Compare Stiglitz testimony, supra note 9 and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Principles of 
Financial Regulation: A Dynamic Portfolio Approach, 16 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 
1, 2 (Spring 2001) available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDS 
ContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/08/23/000094946_03080904003983/Rendered/PDF/multi 
0page.pdf (discussing “an ideological agenda [which] has pushed excessive reliance on . . . 
capital adequacy standards”; arguing that “[d]espite its long history, financial market 
regulation is poorly understood”; and suggesting the need for strong regulation to address 
“[f]ailures in the banking system [which] have strong spillovers, or externalities, that reach 
well beyond the individuals and firms directly involved”) with opponents of Stiglitz who 
have rejected claims of ideological bias and negligence in either policy design or corporate 
executions, e.g., Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even As It 
Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008 
/11/23/business/23citi.html (quoting an April 2008 interview in which Robert Rubin 
assessed his efforts as a director of Citigroup: “In hindsight, there are a lot of things we’d 
do differently.  But in the context of the facts as I knew them and my role, I’m inclined to 
think probably not.”); this reprised an argument made in his autobiography on the financial 
reporting scandals at the turn of the millennium, ROBERT RUBIN, IN AN UNCERTAIN 
WORLD 337 (2003) (“[T]he great bull market masked many sins, or created powerful 
incentives not to dwell on problems when all seemed to be going well—a natural human 
inclination”).  See also, generally, JOSEPH STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES 159–62 
(2003) (recounting internal conflicts within the Clinton administration over the regulation 
of financial markets). 
19 This requires sophisticated mapping of regulatory domains.  See CHRISTOPHER 
HOOD, HENRY ROTHSTEIN & ROBERT BALDWIN, THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK 8 (2004).  It 
also requires deep ethnographic investigation of actual practice and how innovation is both 
conceived as a social good and therefore legitimated.  The classic example is insurance.  
See, e.g., VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE  
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Figure 2 below posits two critical dimensions played by 
accountability in the discourse surrounding the financial crisis.20  
Along one dimension, accountability is presented as either the cause 
and/or cure.  It is the absence or failure of effective accountability that 
provides the focus of the discourse.  In contrast, accountability is also 
central to many discussions about how to deal with specific failures.  
These include, but are not limited to, malfeasance and misfeasance 
such as deceptive or misleading conduct, unethical conduct linked to 
defective internal corporate codes of conduct or governance 
arrangements, and/or the operation of the external regulatory 
architecture. 
It can also be deployed as a counter to the overall conditions that 
caused the crisis, for example the need to respond to the danger posed 
by technical compliance within specific communities, such as among 
lawyers, auditors, rating agency professionals, investment bankers or 
other groupings that play a gatekeeping function. 
 
Perspective Focus on cause Focus on cure 
Accountability-as-
mechanism 
(i.e., control) 
Failure of instrument Reform, replace, repair the instrument 
 
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1979).  A similar dynamic applied to the emergence 
of financial derivatives.  A social network comprising former regulators, academics and 
leading practitioners changed perceptions of the moral utility of options; what had once 
been a dubious gamble came to be regarded as a respected financial instrument.  See 
Donald MacKenzie & Yuval Millo, Negotiating a Market, Performing Theory: The 
Historical Sociology of a Financial Derivatives Exchange, 109 AM. J. OF SOC. 107 (2003).  
This process can generate a powerful ideational paradigm.  See Jonathan Remy Nash, 
Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (2006); see 
generally Tony Porter & Karsten Ronit, Self-Regulation as Policy Process: The Multiple 
and Criss-Crossing Stages of Private Rule-Making, 39 POL’Y SCI. 41 (Mar. 2006); Tony 
Prosser, Regulation and Social Solidarity 33 J.L. & SOC’Y 364, 372 (2006) (noting most 
conflicts in regulation are about fundamental values). 
 What is at issue, therefore, is the extent to which obligation is conceived self-
reverentially in narrow technical terms or more expansively, taking into account individual 
transactions, while legal, may at the same time erode market integrity.  Thomas Clay 
Arnold, Rethinking Moral Economy, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 90–91 (2001) 
(“Constitutive social goods establish and symbolize important senses of self. . . . Insofar as 
constitutive social goods structure the status and obligations of persons, their value 
includes the meaningfulness of the relationships and the senses of self generated.”). 
20 Original framing in Melvin J Dubnick, Toward a “Responsible” Future: Reframing 
and Reforming the Governance of Financial Markets, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 395, 407 (Iain MacNeil & Justin O’Brien eds., 2010). 
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Accountability-as-
setting 
(i.e., normative 
infrastructure) 
Absence or collapse of 
norms, mores, standards 
Reestablishing, 
rebuilding moral 
community based on 
effective 
norms/standards 
FIGURE 2.  Accountability’s Discursive Function 
The second dimension highlights another distinction.  Here, 
accountability can be conceived in either mechanistic or normative 
terms.  In the former sense, being accountable means being subject to 
mechanisms designed to impose some form of control or guidance.  It 
means being answerable, liable, legally obligated, etc.  Alternatively, 
accountability is also treated as a manifestation of the normative 
condition of “being accountable”—as something an agent is or ought 
to be.  What form accountability could or should take is enormously 
controversial.  More specifically, it cuts against the enabling 
underpinning of corporate and contract law.21  This creates two 
interlinked problems.  First, can ethical behavior be evidenced solely 
through compliance with functionally understood legal obligation?  
Second, if acting ethically requires transcending legal obligation, who 
should adjudicate compliance, on what basis, and by what specific 
measure? 
 
 
 
 
  Specificity of Accountable 
Activity 
  Low High 
 
21 The refusal to intervene in the governance of the corporation was indeed deemed as 
its most valuable characteristic.  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of 
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (citing “the recent dominance of a 
shareholder-centered ideology of corporate law among the business, government, and legal 
elites in key commercial jurisdictions” as the critical driver); for contemporary critique, 
see also Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, The End of Corporate Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 703 
(2009) (“in the course of the past century corporate law has been used first to legitimate 
corporate power and then to exempt those exercising it from liability”). 
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 High Constructive 
 
Creation of 
accountable 
space of 
internalized 
norms and 
standards 
Managerial 
 
Establishing 
what agent is 
accountable 
for (objective 
or standard), 
allow agent to 
determine 
“how” 
Autonomy of 
accountable 
agent 
 
Low 
 
Regulative 
 
Creation and 
externalized 
oversight of 
actions of agent 
within 
accountable 
space 
 
Performative 
 
Establishing 
what agent is 
accountable 
for and how 
to proceed 
FIGURE 3.  Accountable Strategies 
These are enormously complex questions.  The courts, particularly 
in the United States, have traditionally been loath to intervene in the 
internal affairs of the corporation (and for good reason).  The lack of 
consensus on the purpose of the corporation has privileged 
managerial and performative approaches to accountability.  The 
relative dominance of each is linked to the boom-bust-regulate-
deregulate-boom-bust cycle.22  Moreover, this desultory spin should 
remind us that the application of ever more detailed proscriptive and 
prescriptive rules does not necessarily lead to the reduction of agency 
problems or inculcation of higher ethical standards.  These rules can 
be and indeed often are transacted around.  The failure of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was designed to ensure the efficacy of 
 
22 For trajectory of corporate governance reform, see Kevin Keasey, Helen Short & 
Mike Wright, The Development of Corporate Governance Codes in the UK, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ACCOUNTABILITY, ENTERPRISE AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISONS 21 (Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson & Mike Wright eds., 2005); for a 
global perspective, see Jennifer Hill, Evolving “Rules of the Game” in Corporate 
Governance Reform, in PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE 
DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION (Justin O’Brien ed., 2007) 29–54. 
224 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 12, 213 
internal controls, makes this abundantly clear.23  Likewise principles 
alone cannot act as a restraining force, as the poor performance of the 
much vaunted risk-based regulatory framework in the United 
Kingdom shows.  As we have seen, traditional regulatory solutions, 
underpinned by performative, managerial and regulative conceptions 
of accountability, have drawbacks if viewed in narrow technocratic 
terms.  What is required, therefore, is a much greater understanding of 
how rules and principles are interpreted within specific communities 
of practice.  Contrary to the assertions of the former chairman of the 
Federal Reserve (in office and in retirement), it is not only possible 
but also necessary to engage in ex ante investigation of the factors 
leading to bouts of irrational exuberance.24 
The presence of actual commitment needs to be investigated (e.g., 
individual corporations and professions charged with gate-keeping 
functions, such as the legal and auditing professions).25  This requires 
a renewed emphasis on how to constitute a truly accountable space 
that simultaneously empowers and enhances personal, professional 
and corporate responsibility.  Here, the professions play a critical 
 
23 See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) 1549–68 (condemning the flawed empirical 
justification); Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1817 (May 2007) (arguing that the Act was designed to achieve a much 
more coherent objective but that its legitimacy is undermined by the dominance of the ill-
conceived panic discourse); for application to the GFC, see Justin O’Brien, Re-Regulating 
Wall Street: Substantive Change or the Politics of Symbolism Revisited?, in THE FUTURE 
OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 12, at 423. 
24 Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, 
Remarks at American Enterprise Institute Dinner (Dec. 5, 1996), available at http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm (asking rhetorically, “[H]ow 
do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then 
become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the 
past decade?”)  The remarks provided the title for a seminal analysis into the dynamics of 
speculative bubbles, ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000).  Shiller, along 
with a Nobel Prize-winning economist at the University of California, Berkeley, have 
applied similar reasoning to the global financial crisis, see GEORGE A. AKERLOF & 
ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS (2009) 4 (“[The crisis] was caused precisely by our 
changing confidence, temptations, envy, resentment, and illusions—and especially by 
changing stories about the nature of the economy”); see also Alan Greenspan, We Will 
Never Have a Perfect Model of Risk, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at 13; Greenspan 
testimony, supra note 9. 
25 Doreen McBarnet, Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal 
Integrity and the Banking Crisis, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 
12, at 67.  The framework utilized, based on close observation, builds on a considerable 
body of empirical work on creative compliance, e.g., DOREEN MCBARNET, CRIME 
COMPLIANCE AND CONTROL (2004); for application to audit community, see also DOREEN 
MCBARNET & CHRISTOPHER WHELAN, CREATIVE ACCOUNTING AND THE CROSS-EYED 
JAVELIN THROWER (2001). 
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monitoring and enforcement role.  A critical determinant of what it 
means to be a member of a profession is to act in the interests of the 
client.  This conception of responsibility is linked to an even more 
vague conception of acting in the public interest.  The conception of 
fiduciary duty becomes problematic, however, when applied to large 
multidisciplinary practices, where boundaries between professional 
groups are exceptionally porous.  This process leaves determining the 
parameters of societal obligation contested.  This constitutive 
dimension of accountability rests at the apex of Williamson’s 
conception of the non-calculative social contract.  It is critical that we 
evaluate the extent to which current professional practice acts as a 
restraining force or justifies symbolic posturing.  These issues are 
explored more fully below in Part V.  First, however, it is necessary to 
identify how official discourse on the GFC has framed both the 
problem and the solutions to the recognized accountability deficit. 
III 
OFFICIAL DISCOURSE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The GFC first displayed its symptoms in the residential 
securitization finance market in the United States but metastasized 
ferociously, particularly across the North Atlantic.26  The major 
identified causes of the meltdown are far from unique.27  The dangers 
associated with excessive reliance on short-term calculations, made 
manifest by flawed remuneration policies, have long exercised the 
academic and policy communities, particularly in the United States.28  
Likewise, the dangers of speculative trading have long been 
 
26 The most complete, if U.S.-centric and partially referenced, accounts are to be found 
in WILLIAM COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS ON 
WALL STREET (2009); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TOO FAIL (2009); GILLIAN TETT, 
FOOLS GOLD (2009); for application to economic theory, see also JOHN CASSIDY, HOW 
MARKETS FAIL (2009); GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS (2009). 
27 See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: 
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 203–22 (2009) (arguing that macroeconomic 
“indicators showed the United States at high risk of a deep financial crisis in the run-up to 
2007 . . . but many [of the specific] problems were hidden in the ‘plumbing’ of the 
financial markets”). 
28 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et 
al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); for application to the fall of Lehman Brothers and collapse of 
Bear Stearns, see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of 
Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON 
REG. 257 (2010). 
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recognized and ignored.29  Less well explored are the cultural and 
ideational factors, such as the privileging of the individual over 
community and the distrust of governmental intervention, that 
coalesced to form the “economically rational.”30  These factors tacitly 
condoned the elevation of short-term considerations over longer-term 
interests within and across the corporate, regulatory and political 
spheres in ways that remain not fully understood.31 
Official discourse has not advanced the debate on how to transcend 
the technical gaming.  This can be traced in part to the propensity for 
policymakers in engage in futile blame games rather than thorough 
investigation.  The power of official discourse to provide a 
compelling independent account of the causes and consequences of a 
specific failure has long been the main but not sole justification for 
independent review.32  Other justifications include the need to be seen 
as dealing decisively with a matter of pressing public concern, thus 
defusing short-term political pressures, legitimizing governmental 
responses, or providing a route-map for policy change.33  Official 
discourse may serve to legitimate existing public policy.  As Burton 
and Carlen have claimed, a critical function of the mechanism is “to 
represent failure as temporary, or no failure at all and to re[]establish 
the image of administrative and legal coherence and rationality.”34  
There is no guarantee that this will occur, especially in cases where 
technological advances and sophisticated uses of that information 
allow for the cross-referencing of disclosed source material and the 
creation of alternative narratives.35  Indeed, following the “Hutton 
 
29 See LAWRENCE MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY (2007) 1–7. 
30 Greenspan testimony, supra note 9. 
31 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 177 (1944) (“We shall not grow wiser 
until we realize that much of what we did before was foolish.”). 
32 For a useful review, focusing primarily on the Commonwealth, see CRIME, TRUTH 
AND JUSTICE: OFFICIAL INQUIRY, DISCOURSE, KNOWLEDGE (George Gilligan & John 
Pratt eds., 2004). 
33 See Scott Prasser, Royal Commissions and Public Inquiries: Their Uses and Scope, 
in ROYAL COMMISSIONS AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 1, 6–8 (Patrick Weller ed. 
1994). 
34 FRANK BURTON & PAT CARLEN, OFFICIAL DISCOURSE: ON DISCOURSE ANALYSIS, 
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE 48 (1979). 
35 A talismanic example is the “Hutton Inquiry” in the United Kingdom, set up to 
investigate the causes of the death of a British weapons inspector who committed suicide 
after he was disclosed as the primary source for a British Broadcasting Corporation report 
that accused the government of “sexing up” intelligence in the lead up to the invasion of 
Iraq.  The Hutton website allowed for cross-referencing of source material to an extent not 
seen before.  See THE HUTTON INQUIRY, www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk (last visited Jan. 
10, 2011).  By contrast, the “Iraq Inquiry,” chaired by Sir John Chilcot into the reasons for 
invading Iraq has a much less sophisticated website, which suggests that placing  
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Inquiry” into the death of a weapons inspector, the cogency of 
alternative critiques was a critical factor in the decision to cede the 
“Butler Inquiry” into the legality of the decision to go to war and the 
quality of governance arrangements. 
The U.K. government’s decision to hold proceedings in camera, in 
turn, created the impetus for the convening of the “Chilcot Inquiry,”36 
which culminated in a public cross-examination of the then-Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, on January 29, 2010, a sitting designed primarily 
to perform a cathartic function.  This cathartic function extends to the 
United States.  It has privileged the use of independent commissions 
to deal with matters of acute public concern, such as Watergate and 
the 9/11 attacks on Washington and New York.  Convening an 
inquiry provides reassurance that lessons will be drawn and acted 
upon (although here too there is no guarantee that the reform agenda 
will be enacted, in particular if the investigative body lacks either 
subpoena power or the willingness to deploy it).37  The decision by 
the United States to convene a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(FCIC or the Commission), under the auspices of the Senate provides 
evidence of both dynamics.38  In interpreting its terms of reference, 
the Commission chairman, Phil Angelides, asserted that the FCIC has 
a mandate to provide a 
full and fair investigation in the interests of the nation—pursuing 
the truth, uncovering the facts and providing an unbiased, historical 
accounting of what brought our financial system and our economy 
to its knees.  This is what the American people deserve and this is 
 
documents into the public domain is less of a priority; see THE IRAQ INQUIRY, 
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).  The point here is not that the “Chilcot 
Inquiry” is less than robust or is designed to blindly advance government policy.  Rather, it 
is to suggest that commissions with judicial power have exceptional power to place 
information into the public domain and allow for electronic cross-referencing, and that 
such power is infrequently used. 
36 Marina Hyde, My Alternative to Another Round of Iraq Whitewashing, GUARDIAN 
(London), July 31, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/ 
jul/31/iraq-inquiry-fourth-plinth-chilcot; see also THE IRAQ INQUIRY, 
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
37 This is precisely the reason media outlets opined that it was essential for any inquiry 
into the financial crisis to have congressional authority, including subpoena power, with 
the Pecora and Watergate Hearings held up as talismanic of best practice; see Editorial, 
Questions for Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009, at WK8. 
38 Editorial, The Show Must Not Go On, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at WK7. 
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what we are obliged to do.  In this critical instance, if we do not 
learn from history, we are unlikely to fully recover from it.39 
Although the FCIC has the capacity to subpoena documents there 
is no evidence to date that it has done so.  Initial public hearings with 
the nation’s top bankers did not elicit granular information about 
strategic motivations and internal processes.40  This failing was most 
apparent in the superficial questioning associated with the credit 
default swap market.  In testimony to the Commission, the chief 
executive of Goldman Sachs, Lloyd Blankfein, rejected charges that 
the bank was profiteering from betting against the very securities it 
was marketing.41  According to Phil Angelides, the practice 
“sound[ed] . . . a little like selling a car with faulty brakes and then 
buying an insurance policy on the drivers of those cars.”42  Blankfein 
claimed Goldman Sachs was compliant with disclosure obligations 
and was merely fulfilling market desires.43  The exchange generated 
more heat than light.  The critical issue was why Goldman Sachs and 
other banks felt it both morally acceptable to engage in such trading 
activities and designed its compliance and codes of conduct 
accordingly. 
Although the FCIC will eventually have a full time staff of 
between forty and fifty investigators and an operating budget of $8 
million, there is a lack of detail about just what it will investigate and 
how.  Moreover, the Commission has been exceptionally tardy in 
creating a communications strategy, a move in sharp contrast to the 
Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) established to ensure that that 
the Department of Treasury was accountable in managing the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program.44  Not only did the COP hold a series 
of meetings outside the Washington Beltway, it actively solicited 
comments from the public.  The COP chair, Elizabeth Warren, used 
her position to advance significant policy recalibration based on a 
 
39 First Public Hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (opening remarks of Phil Angelides, Commission Chairman) (Sept. 17, 2009), 
available at http://fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0113-Transcript.pdf. 
40 See Editorial, supra note 29 (noting the goal was “not to air issues and foster debate, 
but to test views, resolve contradictions and arrive at evidence-based conclusions. . . . 
Serious investigative work is the only way to counter the banks’ political power and alter 
the course of a reform effort that is headed in the wrong direction.”). 
41 Blankfein testimony, supra note 4. 
42 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Washington D.C., Jan. 14, 2010 (P. 
Angelides). 
43 Blankfein testiomony, supra note 4. 
44 For discussion of the role of the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), see JUSTIN 
O’BRIEN, ENGINEERING A FINANCIAL BLOODBATH 98–104 (2009). 
2010] Snaring Leopards 229 
stated need, she saw as unfulfilled, to understand the root causes 
rather than merely the symptoms of the crisis.  This myopia had, 
according to the COP, undermined the consistency and coherence of 
the Treasury Department’s response to the crisis as well as that of 
other financial services regulators.45  For the COP then, it was 
incumbent that any redesign must reflect the inadequacies within the 
theory and practice of regulation.  It remains to be seen whether the 
FCIC will examine these foundational maters but the lack of policy 
coherence to date does little to inspire confidence. 
Across Europe, policymakers face similar pressures, perhaps 
nowhere more so than in Iceland, where a truth commission has been 
established alongside a criminal investigation headed by an 
investigating magistrate brought in from France to assure the public 
that, where possible, wrongdoing would be prosecuted.46  The truth 
commission model allows for the venting and cauterization of anger 
and addresses sectoral responsibilities.  By providing a holistic 
mapping of a crisis it can provide the evidence base on which to 
recalibrate policy.  One of the defining aspects of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was its extensive mapping of 
sectoral responsibility, including the complicity of the judiciary and 
the media.47  Of particularly more significance is the normative 
justification of introducing a redistributive agenda that comprises 
political, social and economic dimensions.  Establishing one, 
however, requires cognizance of the need to address fundamental, if 
not revolutionary, change.48 
 
45 CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM 9 (Second Report, 2009) (“For the Panel, it was important for the 
Treasury and our financial services regulators to have an analysis of the causes and nature 
of the financial crisis to be able to craft a strategy for addressing the sources, and not 
solely the symptoms, of the problem or problems.”). 
46 For background to the Icelandic crisis, see Michael Lewis, Wall Street on the Tundra, 
VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2009, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features 
/2009/04/iceland200904. 
47 See Stephanie Leman-Langlois & Clifford Shearing, Repairing the Future: The 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission at Work, in CRIME, TRUTH AND 
JUSTICE: OFFICIAL INQUIRY, DISCOURSE, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 32. 
48 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is the best-known example 
of how to manage expectations in the aftermath of conflict.  See Stephanie Leman-
Langlois & Clifford Shearing, Repairing the Future: The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission at Work, in CRIME, TRUTH AND JUSTICE: OFFICIAL INQUIRY, 
DISCOURSE, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 32 at 222, 231 (noting that the “truths” established 
were not “scientific truth.  The TRC Report was not science, and it was not meant to be. 
Commissions and the TRC provides an excellent example, establishes truths but they are 
not truth-finding in a scientific sense.  They are rather modern morality plays that mobilise 
facts to articulate and promote normative agendas.”). 
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The chair of the Icelandic commission, Justice Pall Hreinsson, 
argues: “It is paramount that we understand.  So that we can change 
the things we need to, and live with what we have to live with.”49  
Iceland, outside the protection of the European Union, with a small 
population and facing economic devastation had little choice but to 
accept a degree of collective soul-searching.  As Prime Minister 
Johanna Siguroardottir puts it: 
Icelanders are both angry and full of sorrow and anxiety.  They feel 
betrayed in many ways by the state, by the banks and by our allies.  
But the anger is also directed inwards—at ourselves as individuals 
and as a nation.  Why did Icelanders let this happen?  Sorting out 
those feelings will be a long and difficult process.50 
Other countries at the periphery of Europe, including Ireland, 
attempted to cauterize the problems by blaming global forces.  It is a 
predictable and to an extent self-serving response.  In Ireland, tens of 
thousands have taken to the streets to protest against the costs 
associated with bailing out the banking sector, in particular the rescue 
of Anglo-Irish Bank, a deeply flawed institution that has become 
talismanic of poor corporate governance practice.51  The Irish 
government has further sought to deflect blame by commissioning a 
series of semi-private investigations.  As will be explored below, this 
response presents a paradigm case in emasculated responsibility. 
IV 
BANKING ON THE TRUTH? 
The scale of the calamity now facing Ireland far exceeds situations 
faced by any of its European partners, with the possible exception of 
Greece.  Throughout the boom years of the Celtic Tiger economy, the 
population was encouraged to engage in an act of stunning self-
 
49 Simon Bowers, Iceland One Year On: Small Island in Big Trouble, GUARDIAN 
(London), Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/ 
sep/28/iceland-crisis-one-year-on. 
50 Alyssa McDonald, Johanna Siguroardottir—Extended Interview, NEW STATESMAN 
(London), Jan. 15, 2010, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/international-
politics/2010/01/iceland-interview-economy. 
51 Michael Wall & Stephen Collins, Change to Cuts Strategy Ruled Out as Protests 
Seek “Fairer” Way, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 7, 2009, at 1; Rob Brown, Failed By Fianna, NEW 
STATESMAN (London), Jan. 11, 2009, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/ 
economy/2010/01/ireland-irish-social-dublin.  For discussion of the broader issues raised 
by the failure of the Irish banking system, see also FINTAN O’TOOLE, SHIP OF FOOLS 212 
(2009), (noting caustically that one consequence of the decision to nationalize Anglo-Irish 
Bank was that “the state was making its citizens responsible for an institution whose books 
were the most inventive work of Irish fiction since [James Joyce’s] Ulysses.”). 
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deception.  Unsustainable property valuations created not just a 
speculative commercial and residential bubble but also a speculative 
economy.  In a rare admission of failure, the Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, 
accepted “arrogance” played a role in transforming the country from 
“unknown prosperity to suddenly [facing] survival stakes.”52  Brian 
Cowen displayed reticence, however, in accepting political 
responsibility for corporate and regulatory failure.53  At the same 
time, the government has been slow to release information about the 
underlying fragility of the economy, the dependence of the banking 
sector on unsustainable practices and the extent to which regulatory 
and political authorities had knowledge of this vulnerability prior to 
the collapse and, just as significantly, the introduction of the banking 
deposit guarantee and subsequent policy recalibration, including the 
nationalization of Anglo-Irish Bank in January 2009.  This was 
followed by the creation of the National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA), which is designed to restore the capital adequacy of 
remaining banks by buying (at a discount) impaired property loan 
portfolios. 
In January 2010, a full year after the government was forced to 
nationalize the Anglo-Irish Bank, the Finance Minister, Brian 
Lenihan, partially changed tack, arguing that the 
public is entitled to a full examination of what went wrong in our 
banking system.  More than that, we need an inquiry in order to 
restore international and domestic confidence in our banks.  We 
need, as a country, to understand the origins of this crisis so that we 
can ensure that we do not make the same mistakes again.54 
The solemnity of the announcement, made in the Irish parliament, 
mirrored the rhetorical commitment offered by the FCIC in the United 
States.  Significantly, however, the terms of reference set by the Irish 
government and method of inquiry differ dramatically.  Although the 
Irish finance minister has not foreclosed the possibility of a wide-
ranging investigation, a truncated two-stage process is envisaged: 
 
52 Brian Cowen, Speech delivered at the Chamber of Commerce Annual Dinner, 
Dublin, (Feb. 5, 2009), excerpted in Harry McGee, Cowen Says Recession to Cut Living 
Standards By Over 10%, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at 1. 
53 See Jeremy Grant & John Murray Brown, ISE Chiefs Say Irish Opacity Must Be 
Stopped, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 2010, at 14 (quoting the chief executive of the 
Irish Stock Exchange, Deirdre Somers, saying “companies must consider whether their 
historical practices, although accepted in the past, will meet market expectation in the 
future.”  The same article quotes the concerns of the chairman of the ISE, Padraig 
O’Connor, about “a cultural malaise” that must “utterly be changed.”). 
54 Press Release, Statement By the Minister of Finance on Banking, Brian Lenihan, 
(Jan. 19, 2010) http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=6166. 
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First, the Government will immediately commission two separate 
reports—one from the Governor of the Central Bank on the 
performance of the functions of the Central Bank and the Financial 
Regulator and the second from an independent “wise” man or 
woman with relevant expertise to conduct a preliminary 
investigation into the recent crisis in our banking system and to 
inform the future management and regulation of the sector.  These 
reports will also consider the international, social and 
macro[]economic policy environment, which provided the context 
for the recent crisis.  I expect both reports to be completed by the 
end of May this year and laid before the Houses shortly thereafter.  
The second stage of the inquiry will be the establishment of a 
statutory Commission of Investigation, which will be chaired by a 
recognized expert or experts of high standing and reputation.  The 
terms of reference for this commission will be informed by the 
conclusions of the two preliminary reports.  The aim will be for the 
commission to complete its work by the end of this year.  Its report 
will then be laid before the Oireachtas for further consideration and 
action by an appropriate Oireachtas committee.55 
The impetus is credited to the newly appointed governor of the 
Irish Central Bank, Patrick Honohan, who is charged with compiling 
the first document on regulatory failure (but not significantly the 
interaction with the political establishment).  The terms of reference 
also depart in fundamental ways, however, from proposals provided 
by the governor himself the previous month.  Then the governor 
argued that Ireland should follow the U.S. in convening a broad-
ranging commission. 
A hearing such as this one is fine, by and large.  However, this 
issue is bigger and more complicated than one that can be 
accommodated by such a hearing as this where people present 
evidence and then go away.  Also, the question would not be 
sufficiently answered by a judicial inquiry because one is not simply 
trying to find out what happened and the sequence of events.  We 
should think in terms of getting experts, including experts in 
economics and social science and so on, and to blend them with 
politicians and arrive at a panel somewhat like the U.S. congressional 
panels which consider particular issues on an ad hoc basis, such as the 
September 11, 2001 events.56 
 
55 Id. 
56 Discussion with Governor of Central Bank, Hearing before the Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on Economic Regulatory Affairs, DÁIL DEB. Dec. 15, 2009 (Prof. Patrick 
Honohan), http://debates.oireachtas.ie/DDebate.aspx?F=ERJ20091215.xml&Node=H2 
&Page=3.  In written remarks, the Governor of the Central Bank argued the need for new 
models of inquiry. “In considering how best to do this, I suggest that new models need to 
be explored.  The crisis is not simply a question of discovering who did what and who  
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Patrick Honohan intimated in his appearance at the Oireachtas that 
“the crisis is not simply a question of discovering who did what and 
who knew what.  Uncovering the deep roots of the crisis will require 
expertise and broad social scientific understanding more than merely 
forensic skills.”57  As a former academic, the governor is well placed 
to begin this process.  It is questionable, however, whether he is 
permitted to publicly disclose information,58 a point made somewhat 
mischievously by the opposition Labour Deputy Leader, Joan Burton, 
and not altogether convincingly rebutted by the Irish prime minister 
Brian Cowen.  The primary problem with the Irish government’s 
proposal, however, centers on the third component, namely the 
convening of a statutory Commission of Investigation whose terms of 
reference will be determined by the initial reports.  Much depends on 
how the governor (if permitted) and Klaus Regling, a former senior 
official at the German Ministry of Finance and European 
Commission, appointed to draw up the second scoping document, 
interpret their brief and, crucially, the degree to which the subsequent 
Commission of Inquiry interprets both its own mandate and the 
lessons identified.59  Moreover, there is a profound lack of 
transparency in the process, compounded by a lack of direct 
accountability afforded by public hearing or disclosure of 
documentary evidence. 
A properly constituted Commission of Inquiry has a range of 
mandated powers including the capacity to subpoena documentary, 
written and oral evidence.60  At the same time, however, it is 
envisaged that the investigation will be held in private unless “a 
witness requests that all or part of his or her evidence be heard in 
public and the commission accepts the request”61 or “the commission 
 
knew what.  Uncovering the deep roots of the crisis will require expertise and broad social 
scientific understanding more than merely forensic skills.” Id. at 5. 
57 Id. at 5. 
58 CENTRAL BANK ACT 1942 § 31(1) (Act No. 22/1942), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1942/en/act/pub/0022/sec0031.html#zza22y1942s31. 
59 See IRELAND DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, APPOINTMENT OF INDEPENDENT EXPERT 
TO CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INTO BANKING CRISIS, (Jan. 29, 2010) 
http://www.finance.gov.ie/Viewprnt.asp?DocID=6173&StartDate=1+January+2010 
(quoting a statement by Minister of Finance, Brian Lenihan, in which he emphasized the 
need to analyze the “international, social and macroeconomic policy environment in which 
the banking crisis developed.”).  Note that this formulation appears to downplay domestic 
and in particular political factors. 
60 COMMISSIONS OF INVESTIGATION ACT 2004 § 16 (Act No.23/2004), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2004/en/act/pub/0023/index.html. 
61 Id. § 11(1)(a). 
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is satisfied that it is desirable in the interests of both the investigation 
and fair procedures to hear all or part of the evidence of a witness in 
public.”62  Moreover, the legislation specifically allows those giving 
evidence to challenge placing anything on the public record that could 
be deemed commercially sensitive, which is defined as the disclosure 
of information that 
could reasonably be expected to—(a) materially prejudice the 
commercial or industrial interests of the person who provided that 
information to the commission or of a group or class of persons to 
which that person belongs, or (b) prejudice the competitive position 
of a person in the conduct of the person’s business, profession or 
occupation.63 
In announcing the terms of reference, the Finance Minister, Brian 
Lenihan, argued “that for ‘an investigation to proceed speedily and 
cost-effectively, it must be able to conduct its business in private.  
The only other alternative that allows us to conclusively investigate a 
matter is a tribunal of inquiry,’ which would[, he argued,] be too 
costly and protracted.”64  This is, however, political dissembling.  The 
crisis facing the banking system is not a result of recent inept policy 
choices; rather it is a failure to learn the lessons exposed in a series of 
Tribunal of Inquiries convened throughout the late 1990s, which 
continue their work despite corporate obfuscation and increased 
political hostility.  In part, this can be traced to the meandering nature 
of the main political inquiries—an investigation into political 
payments made to the former Fianna Fail prime minister Charles 
Haughey and to Michael Lowry, a former Fine Gael Minister of 
Communications, and a separate inquiry into corruption in the 
planning process in County Dublin—that became mired in judicial 
disputes but which also demonstrated conclusively that corruption 
extended well beyond the named individuals.65  The tribunals were 
convened to demonstrate that Ireland was moving forward and that 
more accountable governance arrangements were put in place. 
Attempts to compartmentalize blame—meaning effectively the denial 
of responsibility—along with media reporting of the costs eroded 
confidence in the tribunal as a mechanism of accountable governance.  
 
62 Id. § 11(1)(b). 
63 Id. § 36(3). 
64 Marie O’Halloran & Michael O’Regan, Lenihan Rejects Oireactas Inquiry Deciding 
on Facts or Individuals, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.irishtimes 
.com/newspaper/ireland/2010/0121/1224262781567.html. 
65 For discussion of the role of the tribunals, see JUSTIN O’BRIEN, THE MODERN 
PRINCE: CHARLES J, HAUGHEY AND THE QUEST FOR POWER (2002). 
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This calamitous failure was masked by the illusion of sustained 
wealth creation brought about through the inflation of a speculative 
bubble. 
If Ireland is to emerge from the banking crisis, it is essential that 
the nexus between the political establishment, the banking sector and 
the developers be explored in a much more systematic manner.  This 
appears unlikely.  The terms of reference specifically preclude 
discussion of political responsibility for either preventing the crisis or 
in responding to it, most notably the shoring up of the Irish banking 
system through the introduction of the blanket guarantee, the 
nationalization of Anglo-Irish Bank, the decision not to nationalize 
the remaining banks, and the decision to create the NAMA.66  Indeed, 
the very existence of NAMA reflects the degradation of Irish 
corporate, political and regulatory governance.  As the operation of 
the COP demonstrated in the United States, the fact that a rescue 
operation is ongoing is an insufficient barrier to introduction of 
effective ongoing accountability monitoring mechanisms.  Moreover, 
the refusal to release information provided to the government 
immediately prior to the introduction of the banking guarantee on the 
grounds of cabinet confidentiality sets a worrisome precedent. 
A “freedom of information” request made in relation to belatedly 
disclosed handwritten records of two meetings at the Department of 
Finance on the night before the guarantee was announced has been 
rejected by the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC).  A 
preliminary finding from a senior investigator in the OIC had held 
“[t]he public interest in the department [of finance] being held to 
account for its decision to commit billions of euro to the banking 
sector in the context of the guarantee would outweigh any damage in 
confidentiality in its dealings with the sector.”67  Significantly, the 
Department of Finance’s objection to the OIC was backed by two of 
Ireland’s leading banks, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank, 
neither of which were publicly at significant risk at the time and both 
of which had argued that they were adequately capitalized.68  One 
 
66 See ENGINEERING A FINANCIAL BLOODBATH supra note 34, at 13–21. 
67 See Mark Tighe, Bank Bailout Meeting to Stay Secret, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Jan. 
24, 2010, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article 
7000036.ece. 
68 The Department of Finance had claimed that the account of the meeting was part of 
an incorporeal cabinet meeting and should remain undisclosed, per the Freedom of 
Information Act (1997) § 19 (1) (c) authorizing nondisclosure of “information (including 
advice) for a member of the Government, the Attorney General, a Minister of State, the 
Secretary to the Government or the Assistant Secretary to the Government for use by him  
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major problem in the Irish context was the lack of disclosure about 
how thinly capitalized the banking sector had become, and the degree 
to which this risk was known by either the boards or the regulator and 
actively or tacitly colluded in by adherence to Government policy. 
Unless this is investigated, Ireland is prone to repeat its failure. 
It would appear likely from the Sunday Times precedent that the 
Commission of Investigation will come under significant pressure be 
forced not to disclose granular information on the grounds that it is 
commercially sensitive and that the Department of Finance, in 
particular, will retreat where possible to obfuscation and delay.  In 
sharp distinction to the Icelandic investigation, which includes a 
degree of contrition, there is no evidence that Ireland is prepared to 
countenance political culpability.  As such, despite nods to principles 
of transparency, accountability and best practice in investigative 
forums, official discourse remains rooted in a culture of denial. 
In each of the jurisdictions surveyed here, with the exception of 
Iceland, official discourse has not gone substantially beyond rhetoric 
in either diagnosing the extent of the problem or its implications for 
the theory and practice of financial regulation.  Placed on a 
continuum, Iceland has gone furthest in determining sectoral 
responsibility while Ireland the shortest.  At a global level, the 
concentration of resources on the resolution of technical matters 
within unstable conceptual frameworks provides little solace that 
substantive change will occur, leaving intact the privileging of the 
politics of illusion. 
 
or her solely for the purpose of the transaction of any business of the Government at a 
meeting of the Government.”  This was upheld by the OIC, which decided that “in view of 
the unprecedented circumstance of this case, the only correct conclusion is to find that the 
primary use of the information was indeed to transact business of the Government at that 
incorporeal Government meeting.”  Case 090028, THE SUNDAY TIMES & DEP’T OF FIN., 
(Jan. 22, 2010) at 4, available at http://oic.gov.ie/en/DecisionsoftheCommissioner 
/LongFormDecisions/Name,11453,en.htm. The decision also addressed concerns that vital 
records were not disclosed to the OIC because of a “simple oversight . . . calls into 
question the efforts made by the Department to fully identify all relevant documents at the 
outset.”  Id.  Moreover, although the OIC allowed the non-disclosure of two key 
documents, she found that ‘it is disappointing that it took 9 months and extensive 
correspondence before the Central Government Department with overall responsibility for 
implementing FOI policy in the public service finally accepted that most of the records it 
had strenuously maintained were extremely sensitive and exempt were, in fact, suitable for 
release.”  Id. 
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V 
DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS 
At a technical level, work towards building a coordinated global 
framework has already taken place, particularly through the auspices 
of the G20.  Implementation remains some way off, however, a point 
underscored by the Secretary General of the International Monetary 
Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, at the World Economic Forum 
meeting in Davos.69  At a regional level, progress has been equally 
glacial.  The European Union has introduced a European Systemic 
Risk Board to be based at the European Central Bank in Frankfurt.  
The aim is to provide an early warning system, capable of heading of 
problems before they occur, the first step towards adopting a more 
pre-emptive approach to banking regulation.  But as representatives of 
central banks and regulatory agencies dominate the proposed 
European Systemic Risk Board, there is a serious question over lack 
of industry and professional representation.  As such, a critical 
information gathering mechanism is lost.  Unresolved, too, are 
significant structural questions.  In particular, there is a failure to 
define what constitutes systemic risk, the specific responsibilities of 
specific epistemic communities in ameliorating those undefined risks 
and what conceptual reengineering is required to take cognizance of 
the limitations of the efficient market hypothesis.  The answers to 
these questions will determine the size and scope of financial markets 
at national, regional and global levels. 
The roadblocks to substantive reform can, in turn, be traced to two 
interlinked factors.  First, there is a lack of clarity over what precise 
combination of incremental factors caused the crisis.  This makes it 
difficult to apportion blame and responsibility and design more 
effective restraining interlocks.  Second, given that the crisis was 
mainly a technically legal failure in which the spirit of regulatory 
rules or principles were transacted around, and responsibility for the 
impact of ethical degradation of professional norms on market 
integrity compartmentalized, a failure to address this dimension in 
 
69 Davos 2010: IMF Urges Global Reform Agreement, BBC NEWS, Jan. 30, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8488927.stm.  In an interview with the BBC’s 
Economic Editor, Stephanie Flanders, Klauss-Kahn suggested there was a serious risk of a 
race to the bottom in global finance as country’s adopted piecemeal changes.  In a second 
interview, Larry Summers, the chief economic advisor to President Obama, argued that the 
introduction of differing institutional and regulatory rules were not necessarily inconsistent 
with global rules on capital adequacy or limits on leverage capacity; see Stephanie 
Flanders, Summers Speaks, BBC NEWS, Jan. 30, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk 
/blogs/thereporters/stephanieflanders/2010/01/summers_speaks.html. 
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policy terms preordains failure.  The central problem rests on the lack 
of any credible proposal to create a new framework capable of 
addressing the erosion of social norms.  Here, Australia provides 
mixed evidence. 
Australia has weathered the GFC better than most developed 
countries, a combination widely attributed to the quality of the 
regulatory regime, risk-aversion by the major banks, the stimulus 
provided by China, higher commodity prices, and a degree of luck.  
The relative strength provides both an opportunity and a risk.  It is an 
opportunity in that Australia has significant credibility in proffering 
regulatory and other solutions.  It is a risk that the absence of 
catastrophic collapse may foster complacency.  The government 
recognized both dynamics in commissioning the “Australia as a 
Financial Centre Report.”70  Although the report provides substantial 
detail on the technical obstacles to developing Australia as a financial 
services hub, significantly less attention is placed on the governance 
agenda.  In part, this can be traced to the difficulties associated with 
determining what accountable governance means in practice.  Noting 
the enormous potential, the Australian Financial Centre Forum 
articulated a vision that cautioned policymakers against attempting to 
attract investment solely through pricing mechanisms.  Instead it 
suggested aspiring towards the following vision: 
A financial sector which is open, competitive and underpinned by 
strong, stable and sound institutions.  It exhibits the lowest possible 
barriers to entry consistent with the maintenance of financial stability 
and integrity, so as to encourage new entrants and foster price 
competition and innovation.  It is a sector with a reputation for 
transparency, integrity and efficiency.  It is a sector where the critical 
mass of skills, experience and reputation encourages both domestic 
and international participants to do business.  It thus exhibits a high 
volume of cross-border transactions in a wide variety of financial 
products, services and currencies.71 
The vision combines the technical with the normative, i.e., not just 
what is but what ought to be.  It envisages a much higher ethical 
content in regulatory and corporate practice.  Crucially, it suggests 
that successful reform requires the creation of shared understanding 
of private rights and public duties.  Less well explored is how this 
 
70 AUSTL. FIN. CTR. FORUM, AUSTRALIA AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE (2009), available at 
http://www.aiia.com.au/docs/nsw%20documents/reports%20non-aiia/AFCF_Building_on 
_Our_Strengths_%20Report.pdf. 
71 Id. at [p. 9 of pdf] 
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vision can be rendered operational.  The critical design challenge 
necessitates resolving what Millon refers to as the existential conflicts 
“between a public law, regulatory conception of corporate law on the 
one hand, and a private law, internal perspective on the other;” and 
“between a body of law concerned solely with the techniques of 
shareholder wealth-maximization [and] a body of law that embraces 
and seeks to promote a richer array of social and political values.”72 
President Obama has put this exceptionally neatly: 
We know that markets are not an unalloyed force for either good or 
for ill.  In many ways, our financial system reflects us.  In the 
aggregate of countless independent decisions, we see the potential 
for creativity—and the potential for abuse.  We see the capacity for 
innovations that make our economy stronger—and for innovations 
that exploit our economy’s weaknesses.  We are called upon to put 
in place those reforms that allow our best qualities to flourish—
while keeping those worst traits in check.  We’re called upon to 
recognize that the free market is the most powerful generative force 
for our prosperity—but it is not a free license to ignore the 
consequences of our actions.73 
There can be no doubting the rhetorical flair.  Unfortunately, as 
with the Australian report, it leaves unresolved the question of how to 
design mechanisms that allow for a more precise calibration of ethical 
content. 
If moral accountability is to have meaning beyond rhetoric, it is 
essential to parse its multifaceted dimensions as both cause (i.e., 
through its absence) and putative cure for solving endemic market 
failure in capital market governance from an applied ethics 
perspective.74  What also remains unclear is how to rank competing, 
potentially incommensurable interpretations of what constitutes 
appropriate behavior.  Can one say, for example, that acting within 
the confines of the law evidences integrity?  This cannot be a 
satisfactory answer given the ethical void experienced in both fascist 
and totalitarian societies, each governed by legal (if morally 
repugnant) frameworks.75  The scale of ethical failure witnessed in the 
 
72 Millon, supra note 1, at 202; see also sources cited supra note 1. 
73 Obama, supra note 2. 
74 Integrity has also long been recognized as an important intangible asset or liability in 
strategic management studies.  See MUEL KAPTEIN & JOHAN WEMPE, THE BALANCED 
COMPANY: A THEORY OF CORPORATE INTEGRITY 145–52 (2002) (noting that 
organizational structure and culture generate in a reflexive manner the execution of 
specific corporate practices). 
75 This is the classic focus on a legendry debate in contemporary legal philosophy of 
what constitutes law.  The positivist approach suggests law is merely what is in statute 
books, a historical record made by properly constituted legislatures.  See, e.g., H.L.A.  
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global financial crisis demonstrates the inherent limitations of black-
letter law as a sufficient bulwark even within the liberal democratic 
state.  It is equally unsatisfactory to root integrity lexicographically in 
the application of consistent behavior.  Consistently, engaging in 
deceptive misleading practice may demonstrate “wholeness” or 
“completeness” but it cannot be a constituent of integrity. Integrity 
therefore requires of us not only duty (i.e., compliance with the law; 
consistent and coherent actions) but also principles that contribute to 
(and do not erode) social welfare (i.e., treating people, suppliers and 
stakeholders with fairness and respect).  Seen in this context, 
enhancing integrity through higher standards of business ethics is a 
question of organizational design.  The aim, in short, is to give 
substance to what constitutes—or should constitute—appropriate 
principles of aspiration for the professions. 
Business ethics research tends to calcify around one of four main 
theoretical approaches: deontological, consequential or utilitarian, 
virtue-ethics and contextual ethics.  The deontological approach 
derives from Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative, namely “act 
only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law.”76  Reliance on short-term 
profiteering that if universalized (and condoned by regulatory and 
political authorities) destroys the credibility of the market is 
ultimately self-defeating.  In deontological terms, the crisis displays 
systemic unethical tendencies.  Moreover, deceptive or misleading 
conduct debases moral capacities (indeed it may well also be illegal if 
the action can be demonstrated to contravene trade practices 
legislation).  The third categorical imperative is to ensure that 
corporate actions have societal beneficence; a formulation that also 
lies at the centre of Adam Smith’s landmark Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759).  In Kantian terms, this can only be vouchsafed if 
the organization acts and is seen to act within defined ethical 
parameters.  The GFC clearly demonstrates how the search for yield, 
at any price, trumped prudence and societal obligation. 
 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).  Others have argued that properly constituted law 
cannot be vouchsafed unless underpinned by an explicit moral component.  E.g. Fuller, 
supra note 26, 245–53 (outlining the case of the grudge informer); see also Barry 
Macleod-Cullinane, Lon L. Fuller and the Enterprise of Law 22 LEGAL NOTES 1, at 3 
(1995); see generally David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller’s Legal Ethics 11 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 801 (1998).  A third approach, suggests that propositions of law are true if they 
figure in or follow from principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that 
provide the best constructive interpretation of agreed legal practice, see, e.g., RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
76 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (1785). 
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Even if one views the global financial crisis from the less 
demanding utilitarian perspective, the consequential impact—
unintended, to be sure–makes both the activity itself and the 
underpinning regulatory framework equally ethically suspect.  Here it 
is essential to differentiate between the product and the clearly 
inappropriate uses to which it was put to work.  There is nothing 
unethical about securitization per se.  However, from an ethical 
perspective it is a deficient defense to claim ignorance of either how 
these products were structured or how unstable the expansion of 
alchemistic engineering had made individual banks or the system as a 
whole.  It is now recognized, for example, that the originate-
distribute-relocate model of financial engineering significantly 
emaciated corporate responsibility precisely because it distanced 
institutional actors at every stage of the process from the 
consequences of their actions.  Likewise, given the huge social and 
economic cost, it is deficient for policymakers to profess shock at the 
irresponsibility of banks, insurance companies and the rating 
agencies.77  The failure to calculate the risks and design or recalibrate 
restraining mechanisms at the corporate, regulatory and political 
levels has now grossly exacerbated the costs borne by the wider 
society. 
The third major approach to evaluate the ethical dimension of 
corporate activity is, perhaps more demanding.  It is also more fruitful 
in terms of refashioning corporate and regulatory action.  While the 
policy response to scandal has traditionally been to emphasize 
personal character, much less attention has been placed on how 
corporate, professional, regulatory and political cultures inform, 
enhance or restrain particular character traits.78  The focus of virtue-
based analysis is not on formal rules (which can be transacted around) 
or principles (that lack the definitional clarity to be enforceable).  
Rather, it focuses on how these rules and principles are interpreted in 
specific corporate, professional or regulatory practice.  This 
ultimately, is a question of individual and collective character, or 
integrity.  There is prescience to Alasdair MacIntyre’s argument that 
the “elevation of the values of the market to a central social place” 
risks creating the circumstances in which “the concept of the virtues 
might suffer at first attrition and then perhaps something near total 
 
77 See Brown, supra note 2; Greenspan testimony, supra note 9; Obama supra note 44. 
78 But see RICHARD SENNETT, THE CULTURE OF THE NEW CAPITALISM (2006) and 
RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER (1998). 
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effacement.”79  This builds on earlier insight that suggested that 
“effectiveness in organizations is often both the product and the 
producer of an intense focus on a narrow range of specialized tasks 
which has as its counterpart blindness to other aspects of one’s 
activity.”80  Compartmentalization occurs when a “distinct sphere of 
social activity comes to have its own role structure governed by its 
own specific norms in relative independence of other such spheres.  
Within each sphere those norms dictate which kinds of consideration 
are to be treated as relevant to decision-making and which are to be 
excluded.”81  For MacIntyre, the combination of 
compartmentalization and focus on external goods, such as profit 
maximization, corrodes capacity for the developments of internal 
goods, which should be developed irrespective of the consequences.82 
It is incumbent upon regulatory authorities (formal and informal) to 
identify and break down the compartmentalization imperatives at 
corporate and professional levels and integrate the form and purpose 
of business ethics into a wider social contract.  It is in this context that 
the fourth key dimension of business ethics theory comes into play: 
the contextual material and ideational environment in which social 
norms play out.83  It is mistaken to assume that social norms, once 
accreted remain static, impervious to environmental corrosion.84  A 
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80 Alasdair MacIntyre, Why Are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble, in MORAL 
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critical feature of the global financial crisis was the fact that much of 
what occurred was legal.85  Indeed earlier empirical work conducted 
in late 2006 and early 2007 highlighted just how corroded restraining 
mechanisms had become in the City of London and New York and 
how unstable the underpinning framework had become.86 
The search for answers and the putative solutions necessitate that 
we pay much more attention to the normative dimension of the 
regulation of capital markets.  This, in turn, suggests that regulatory 
effectiveness cannot be vouchsafed merely by reforming the 
institutional structure, articulating the parameters of what constitutes 
“smart regulation,” which lacks a normative dimension, nor on the 
questionable efficacy of enrollment, without articulating precisely 
what is meant by business integrity and accountability within specific 
contexts.87 
 
CONCLUSION 
The central argument of this article is that we require a synthesis 
between an appreciation of context, the need for virtuous behavior 
and the importance of deontological rules and consequential 
principles of best practice within an overarching framework that is not 
subverted by compartmentalized responsibilities.88  The policy 
problem is not the relative importance of virtue but whether it can be 
rendered operational in a systematic, dynamic and responsive way, 
with specific benefits to business.89  Accountability is, therefore a 
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design question at both corporate and regulatory levels, which to be 
effective needs to be mutually reinforcing and address dynamically 
the calculative, social and normative reasons for behaving in a more 
(or less) ethically responsible manner.90  This is the challenge of our 
time. 
Resolving this issue in capital markets can have an enormous 
demonstrative effect on other wicked problems, such as climate 
change and national security.  It is no longer sustainable to allow 
institutions deemed too big to fail to trade in a manner that maximizes 
its own self-interest, exacerbates the risk of market instability and yet 
benefit from public largesse in the event that it requires guaranteed 
funding from a lender of last resort.  Equally, it is no longer 
sustainable to expect markets to self-correct.  As even the most ardent 
defender of free markets Fredrick Hayek has pointed out, there is 
“indeed a wide and unquestioning field for state activity.”  In no 
system that could be rationally defended would the state just do 
nothing.  An effective competitive system needs an intelligently 
designed and continuously adjusted legal framework as much as any 
other.91  Uncommonly sane words indeed from the intellectual 
godfather of the Chicago school. 
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